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accorded; that the mere fact that a corporation is the alter 
ego of an individual is not sufficient, but that when it is 
shown that the separate entity was "fabricated and assumed 
for the purpose of perpetrating a fraud, a court of equity is 
justified in disregarding the corporate fiction in order to 
reach the individuar and fasten upon him liability for his 
fraudulent action." (Sunset Farms, Inc., V. Superior Oourt, 
supra.) Corporations cannot be used as cover for fraud and 
the court will look through the form of the corporate entity 
to ascertain its actual purpose and intent. (Olark v. Millsap, 
supra.) The trial court has looked through the form of the 
corporate entity. It found the intent and purpose of the de-
fendants to be free from the fraud charged by the appellants. 
Before the acts and obligations of a corporation may be recog-
nized as those of a particular P!ll'son under the alter ego 
doctrine, it must be shown that an adherence to the corporate 
entity under the particular circumstances would sanction a 
fraud or promote injustice. (Minifie v. Rowley, 187 Cal. 481, 
487 [202 Pac. 673] ; Sunset Farms, Inc., V. Superior Oourt, 
supra.) In this case the court was justified in concluding 
in effect that the delay in the sale of the corporate properties 
was due to the depressed state of the market and otherwise 
to circumstances beyond the control of the defendants; like-
wise that the directors and trustees were not guilty of any 
breach or dereliction of duty or any fraud so as to entitle 
the appellants to relief. 
Pursuant to their request, the appeal of the plaintiffs is 
dismissed. The judgment against the interveners is affirmed. 
Carter, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred. 
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[So F. No. 16447. In Bank.-April 2, 1941.] 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA (Acting By and Through Its 
Department of Public Works), Respondent, v. MARIN 
MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT,Appellant. 
[1] Highways-Rights and Title-Franchises Along B:ighways-
Relocation of Structures-Franchise of Municipal Water Dis-
trict.-The right obtained by a municipal water district to 
place water mains in highways under Deering's General Laws, 
1937, Acts 5193, 5194, section 1, and under a franchise of its 
predecessor, a private corporation, is a franchise within 
Streets and Highways Code, section 680, so as to authorize 
the Department of Public Works to recover the costs of 
removal to another location in order to permit state highway 
improvement. 
[2] ld.-Rights and Title-Franchises Along Highways-Reloca-
tion of Structures-"Persons".-The word "person" in Streets 
and Highways· Code, section 680, authorizing· the Department 
of Public Works to require the removal of structures on state 
highways, embraces a municipal water district. The applica-
tion of the section to such districts does not result in a limita-
tion upon their valid power; but operates only to prevent 
. them from exercising their franchises in a manner contrary 
to law. 
[3] Statutes-Operation-Operation Against State.-The general 
words in a statute will not be construed to limit the other-
wise valid power of the state or its subdivisions unless that 
result was specifically intended by the legislature. 
[4] :Highways-Rights and Title-Franchises Along :Highways-
Relocation of Structures-"Upon".-The provision of Streets 
and Highways Code, section 680, authorizing the Department 
of Public Works to direct the removal of any pipe line or 
other structure "upon" a state highway is not by reason of the 
word "upon" inapplicable to a pipe line in or under a high-
way. , 
[6] ld.-Rights and .Title-Franchises Along Highways-Reloca-
tion of Structures-Validity of Statute.-'-The provision of 
Streets and Highways Code, section 680, whereby a municipal 
water district maybe required to bear the expense of relocat-
ing a pipe line in a state highway when necessary to permit 
McK. Dig~ References: I, 2, 4. Highways, § 108; 3. Statutes, 
§ 20; 6. Constitutional Law, § 106. 
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improvement of the highway or insure safety of the travelling 
public, is a valid exercise of police power. 
[6] Constitutional Law - Police Power - Scope- Oonstitutional 
Limitations.-The determination of whether a statute coil-
stitutes a taking of property without due process of law or 
an impairment of the obligation of a contract con3ists in 
balancing the burden placed on the individual or corporation 
on the one hand against the benefit which will accrue to the 
public as a whole on the other. If the benefit to the public 
outweighs the burden on the individual, the statute is a valid 
exercise of the police power. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Marin County. Edward I. Butler, Judge. Affirlned. 
Duke & Cowen, Robert D. Duke and Lawrence .A. Cowen 
for Appellant. 
John J. O'Toole, City Attorney (San Francisco), Dion 
R. Holm, Deputy City Attorney, T. P. Wittschen, L. W. 
Irving, Hankins & Hankins, Fred M. Bottorff, James H. 
Howard and Charles C. Cooper, Jr., as Amici Ouriae, on 
behalf of Appellant. 
C. C. Carleton, Chief Attorney, Frank B. Durkee, Robert 
.E. Reed and C. R. Montgomery for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-In 1909 the Marin County Water and 
Power Company, a private corporation, acquired from the 
Board of Supervisors of Marin County the right to place 
a twelve-inch water main along the south side of Bolinas 
Street between Madrone and Grove Streets in Marin County. 
In 1920 the Marin Municipal Water District, organized un-
der the Municipal Water District Act (Stats. 1911, p. 1290; 
Deering's Gen. Laws, Act No. 5243), aequired from the 
Power Company full title to the water main which it there-
after maintained and operated. In 1936, when the California 
State Highway was under construction northward from the 
Golden Gate Bridge, the construction plans called for in-
corporatingBolinas Street as part of the highway, and the 
engineers found that a relocation of the water main would 
be necessary. [1] Accordingly, the Department of Public 
6. See 5 Cal. Jur. 695 i 11 Am. Jur. 995. 
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Works of the State of California, Mting pursuant to section 
680 of the Streets and Highways Code, on May 22, 1936, 
served upon the Water District a written demand that it 
relocate its water main. When the Water District failed to 
comply, the Department of Public Works proceeded to move 
the water main and relocate it in a differellt position on the 
same Highway. The state then instituted this action to re-
r,over from the Water District the cost of material, labor, and 
equipment required for the removal and relocation of the 
water main. 
The trial court awarded plaintiff a judgment for $3,618.14. 
Defendant has appealed, contending that section 680 is not 
applicable in the present situation, and that it violates the 
due process and impairment of contracts provisions of the 
state and federal Constitutions. 
Section 680 of the Streets and Highways Code, upon which 
plaintiff's action is based, provided in 1935, as follows: 
"Whenever a franchise shall have been granted by any 
county or city in any public highway which has been or is 
subsequently constituted a State highway, the department 
may enforce any obligations of the grantee or holder of such 
franchise in respect to the repair of the highway. The de~ 
partment may require any person who has placed and main-
tained any pole, pole line, pipe, pipe line, conduit, street 
railroad tracks, or other structures or facilities Upon any 
State highway, whether under such or any franchise, to 
move the same at his own cost and expense to such different 
location in the highway as is specified in a written demand 
of the department, whenever necessary to insure the safety 
of the traveling public or to permit of the improvement of 
the highway; provided, that no such change of location shall 
be required for a teinporary purpose. The department shall 
specify in the demand a reasonable time within which the 
work of relocation must be ,commenced and the grantee or 
oWner must commence such relocation within the time speci-
fied in said demand and thereafter diligently prosecute the 
sarne to ·completioIL 
"The department may likewise serve such a demand on the 
owner of any encroachment to require its removal entirely 
from the right of way, where the owner does not have an 
existing franchise right to place and tnainta:in the same 
therein. 
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"In case the owner fails to comply with any such demand, 
the encroachments specified in the demand become subject 
to the provisions of .Article 3 of this chapter." 
There is ample evidence to support the finding of the trial 
court that the main in its original location interfered with 
the construction of the state highway and that its removal 
and relocation were necessary to permit the construction and 
improvement of the highway and insure the safety of the 
traveling public. Defendant points out, however, that sec-
tion 680 applies only to holders of a franchise, and defendant 
contends that its right to maintain water mains along Bolinas 
Street is not a franchise. 
Its right is derived from several sources. First, it ac-
quired all of the assets and property of its predecessor in 
interest, the Marin County Water and Power Company, but 
since the Power Company possessed no more than a franchise 
from the Board of Supervisors of the county, defendant 
could acquire no· right greater than a franchise from this 
source. 
Secondly, the legislature in 1911 adopted an act (Stats. 
1911, p. 852; Deering's Gen. Laws, Act No. 5194), section one 
of which provides in part as follows: 
"That there is granted to every municipal corporation of 
the State of California, the right to construct, operate and 
maintain water . . . pipes, mains or conduits . . . along or 
upon any road, street, ... or highway, or across any rail-
way . . . , in such manner as to afford security for life and 
property. . . . " In 1923 another statute was enacted grant-
ing similar privileges to municipal corporations to construct 
facilities within highways. (Stats. 1923, p. 147; Deering's 
Gen. Laws, Act No. 5193.) 
Defendant must be considered a municipal corporation 
within the meaning of these enactments. Its fUnctions are 
substantially the same as those of water districts operated by 
cities or counties. It is a corporate body organized to sup-
ply water to a defined area including both incorporated and 
unincorporated territory, and it has the power of taxation. 
It is reasonable to construe these statutes as granting a right 
of way in state highways to public water corporations of 
this type as well as to those operated by cities and counties. 
(See Morrison v. Smith Bros., 211 Cal. 36 [293 Pac. 53]; 
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Henshaw v. Foster, 176 Cal. 507 [169 Pac. 82] ; In re Orosi 
Public Utility Dist., 196 Cal. 43 [235 Pac. 1004J.) 
Finally, the act under which defendant was organized 
(Stats. 1911, p. 1290; Deering's Gen. Laws, Act No. 5243), 
provides: 
"The board of directors shall have power to construct 
works across any stream of water, watercourse, street, avenue, 
highway, railway, canal, ditch, or flume which the route of 
said works may intersect or cross; provided, such works are 
constructed in such manner as to afford security for life 
and property, and said board of directors shall restore the 
crossings and intersections to their former state as near as 
may be, or in a manner not to have impaired unnecessarily 
their usefulness. Every company whose right of way shall 
be intersected or crossed by said works shall unite with said 
board of directors in forming said intersections and crossings 
and grant the rights therefor. The right of way is hereby 
given, dedicated and set apart to locate, construct and main-
tain said works over and through any of the lands which are 
now or may be the property of this state, and to have the 
same rights and privileges appertaining thereto as have been 
or may be granted to municipalities within the state." 
The first plJ,rt of this provision confers upon defendant 
only a right to cross public highways. The last part confers 
a right of way over and through state lands. Since this 
right is no greater than that already obtained by defendant 
under the acts of 1911 and 1923, it is unnecessary to deter-
mine whether the state lands over which a right of way is 
given include state highways. 
The right obtained by defendant from these sources is a 
right conferred by the legislature to construct and operate 
pipe lines along the public highways of the state. Such a 
grant by the state to a public utility of the right to use the 
public streets and highways for the maintenance of equip-
lllent has always been considered a franchise by the courts 
of this state. The right granted to municipal corporations 
by the statute of 1923 to use the public highways was held a 
franchise in Los Angeles v. South Gate, 108 Cal. App. 398 
[291 Pac. 654]. The right granted to public utilities by 
article XI, section 19 of the California Constitution to use 
city streets for laying down and maintaining pipes was held 
a franchise in San Jose Gas Co. v. January, 57 Cal. 614. 
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(See, also, Stockton Gas & Electric 00. v. San Joaquin 00., 
148 Cal. 313 [83 Pac. 54, 7 Ann. Cas. 511, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
1741; Olark v. Los Angeles, 160 Cal. 30 [116 Pac. 722].) The 
right granted to telephone and telegraph companies by Civil 
Code, section 536, to maintain pole lines on highways was 
held a franchise in Western Union Tel. 00. v. Hopkins, 160 
Cal. 106 [116 Pac. 557] ; SU'nset Tel. & Tel 00. v. pasadena, 
161 Cal. 265 [118 Pac. 7961 ; and Postal Tel. & Oable 00. v. 
Los Angeles, 164 Cal. 156 [128 Pac. 191· The right granted 
to irrigation districts by a 1923 statute (Stats. 1923, p. 449) 
to use the streets and highways for power lines waS held a 
franchise in Winkie v. Turlock Irr. Dist., 24 Cal. App. (2d) 1 
[74 Pac. (2d) 302]. In the present case the defendant's 
right of way in the state highway is likewise a franchise. 
[2, 3] Section· 680 provides that any person may be re-
quired by the Department of Public Works to move his pipe-
line. Section 19 of the same code defines a person as "any 
person, firm, partnership, association, corporation, organiza-
tion, or business trust." Defendanteontends, however, that 
section 680 cannot apply to it because it is a subdivision of 
the state. It is a well established doctrine that general words 
in a statute will not be construed to limit the otherwise valid 
power of the state or its subdivisions unless that result was spe-
cificallyintended by the legislature. (Butterworth v. Boyd, 
12 Cal. (2d) 140 [82 Pac. (2d) 434, 126 A. L. R. 8381 ; Bal-
thasar v. Pacific Elec. Ry. 00., 187 Cal. 302 [2G2 Pac. 37, 19 
A. L. R. 4521 ; Mayrhofer v. Board of Education, 89Ca!. 110 
[26 Pac. 646, 23 Am. St. Rep. 4511 ; Dollar Savings Bank v. 
United States, 19 Wall. 227 (U. S. 1873) [22L. Ed. 801.) 
Defendant derived its franchise by virtue of its existence as 
a subdivision of the state from the Statutes of 1911 and 1923, 
supra. These statutes confer upon it a right to maintain a 
pipeline along the streets . and highways of the state only 
"in such manner as to afford security for life and property." 
Section 680 of the Streets and Highways Code gives the De-
partment of Public Works the authority to require removal 
ofa pipeline at the owner's expense when "necessary to in-
sure the safety of the traveling public or to permit the im-
provement of the highway." It is clear that neither defend-
ant nor any other municipal water district has the authority 
to maintain pipes on the highway in a position which does 
not afford security for life or property, and therefore that 
I 
I 
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the application of section 680 to municipal water districts 
would not result in a limitation upon their otherwise valid 
power, but would operate only to prevent them from exercis-
ing their franchises in a manner contrary to law. It is rea-
sonable to assume that the legislature intended to provide 
some method for the enforcement of this restriction upon 
municipal water districts. Section 680 supplies the means 
for such enforcement. The most consistent interpretation of 
the section, therefore, is that the legislature intended to in-
clude municipal water districts withm its application. 
[4] Defendant also contends that section 680 whicb re-
fers only to pipe lines upon the state highway, does not 
apply to it because its own main is below the surface... Such 
a limited construction would be manifestly unreasonable. 
The word "upon" means not only "on top of" but also "in 
or into the position of being supported by ... something." 
(Webster's New International Dictionary.) Article II, chap-
ter3, division 1 of the Streets and Highways Code, wherein 
section 680 appears, is concerned with tbe general subject 
of encroachments on state highways, and the last paragraph 
of section 680 refers to the pipe lines, telephone lines, etc., re-
ferred to in the earlier part· of the section, as encroachments. 
Section 660 (b) of the Streets and Highways Code defines 
encroachments as iricluding "any . . . pipe, pipe line . . . 
which is placed in, tinder or over any portion of the highway". 
Defendant's pipe line is thus clearly within the purView of 
section 680. 
[5] The final contention urged by defendant is that sec-
tion 680 cannot make it bear the expense of relocating its own 
water main without violating the provisions of the state and 
federal Constitutions against impairing the obligation of con-
tracts and taking property without due process of law. The 
United States Supreme Court has held that a municipal cor-
poration whether acting in a so-called "governmental" 
capacity or "proprietary'; capacity has no standing to invoke 
the impairment of contracts clause or the. provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution in 
opposition to acts of the state legislature. (Trentfm v.New 
Jersey, 262 U. S. 182 [43 Sup. Ct. 534, 67 L. Ed. 9371; Cole-
man v. Mtller, 307 U. S. 433 at 441 [59 Sup. Ct. 972, 83 L. Ed. 
1385, 122 A. L. R. 695].) Whether or not the like guar-
antees in the California Constitution apply as between the 
1'1 O. (:ad)~:ai 
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state and its subdivisions (cf. Beverly Hills v. Los A.ngeles, 
175 Cal. 311 [165 Pac. 924]), the legislation here in question 
is clearly within that residuary power of the state to protect 
the health, safety, and morals of its inhabitants known as the 
"police power". [6] The determination of whether a stat-
ute constitutes a taking of property without due process of law 
or an impairment of the obligation of a contract consists in 
balancing the burden placed on the individual or corporation 
on the one hand against the benefit which will accrue to the 
public as a whole on the other. If thebenent to the public 
outweighs the burden on the individual, the statute is a. valid 
exercise of the "police power". Section 680 requires the 
relocation of pipe, lines only when necessary to permit the 
improvement of the highway or to insure the safety of the 
traveling public. The trial court found in the present case 
. that the removal and relocation of defendant's main was 
necessary to insure the safety of the traveling public and to 
permit the construction of the highway. Defendant has not 
been deprived of its franchise; it has simply been required 
to bear the expense of removing its mains to a location on 
the highway consonant with public welfare. The benefit to 
the .. public as a whole thus clearly outweighs the burden 
imposed upon defendant, and the legislation is therefore 
valid. (Merced Falls Gas &; Elec. Co. v. Turner, 2 Cal. App. 
720 [84 Pac. 239]; New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage 
Com., 197 U. S. 453 [25 Sup. Ct. 471,49 L. Ed. 831].) Fur-
thermore, the statutes of 1911 and 1923, upon which defend-
ant relies to establish its right of way in the highway, grant 
the right to maintain a pipe line "in such manner as to 
afford security for life and property" (Stats. 1911, p. 1290), 
and thereby outlaw the maintenance of such pipe lines in a 
manner injurious to life or property. 
'The judgment is affirmed. 
Edmonds, J., Curtis, J., and Shenk, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 1, 
1941. 
April, 1941. J Los ANGELES V. SUPERIOR COURT. 707. 
[So F. No. 16293. In Bank.-April 16, 1941.] 
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES at al., Petitioners, V. SUPE-
RIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respond-
~nt. 
[1] Prohibition-Application of RuleS-General Considerations-
Parties-Jurisdictional Defect.-Prohibition will not lie to 
restrain the trial of an action because of failure to join 
parties unless they are "indispensable parties." Only in such 
case is the procedural defect jurisdictional. 
[2] Administrative taw-Administrative Procedure or Construc-
tion of Statute-Legal Sanction-Long Usage.-While a 
course of administrative procedure, or an administrative con-
struction of a statute, does not acquire legal sanction merely 
from long usage, it will be accorded great respect and will 
be upheld, if not clearly erroneous. 
[3] Taxation~Remedies of Taxpayer-Claim for Taxes Errone-
ously Collected - Action upon Claim - Parties. _ Although 
Political Code, section 3804, does not expressly designate who 
shall be the party or parties defendant in an· action to collect 
a refund of 'tax as erroneously collected, its provisions as a 
whole admit of no other construction than that the county 
is authorized to appear and defend suits for refund on behalf 
of other entities whose taxing functions have been trans-
ferred to and consolidated with those of the county, and 
whose adoption of the county system has included the assess-
ment and collection of taxes and refund procedure. Such 
construction of the statute, when read in light of Constitu-
tion, article XI, sections 6, 8, does not contravene section 13 . 
of the same article. 
[4] Id.-Remedies of Taxpayer-Claim for Taxes Erroneously 
Collected ~ Actions upon Claims - Parties - Delegation of 
Right to Defend-Revocation.-Rega~dless of whether a city 
would have power to delegate to a county its right to defend 
against a claim for taxes erroneously collected, such delega-
tion was in fact made under terms· of Political Code, section 
3804, at the time the city by ordinance, sanctioned by Con-
stitution, article XI, section 6, availed itself of the privilege 
of consolidating its taxing functions with the county system. 
Such delegation as to tax collections in a given year was not 
McK. Dig. References: 1. Prohibition, § 23; 2. Administrative 
Law; 3, 4, 7. Taxation, § 294; 5, 6. laxation, § 108. 
